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Abstract
Corruption is one of the most pervasive obstacles to economic and
social development. However, in the existing literature it appears that
corruption seems to be less harmful in some countries than in others.
The most striking examples are well known as the "East Asian para-
dox": countries displaying exceptional growth records despite having
thriving corruption cultures. The aim of this paper is to explain the
high corruption but fast economic growth puzzle in China by providing
rm-level evidence of the relation between corruption and growth and
investigating how nancial development inuences the former relation-
ship. Our empirical results show that corruption is likely to contribute
to rmsgrowth. We further highlight the substitution relationship
between corruption and nancial development on rm growth. This
means that corruption appears not to be a vital constraint on rm
growth if nancial markets are underdeveloped. However, pervasive
corruption deters rm growth where there are more developed nan-
cial markets. This implies that fast rm growth will not be observed
until a later stage of Chinas development when nancial markets are
well-functioning and corruption is under control. Furthermore, the
substitution relationship exists in the private and state-owned rms.
Geographically, similar results can be seen in the Southeast and Cen-
tral regions.
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1 Introduction
Bureaucratic corruption is pervasive throughout the world.1 The relation-
ship between corruption and economic growth has been broadly studied in
the literature. Corruption is one of the most pervasive obstacles to economic
growth and social development, as it is well observed that some countries
with poor economic performance also su¤er from severe corruption. From
the theoretical point of view, many researchers attempt to explain this phe-
nomenon by addressing various issues in the macroeconomics of misgover-
nance (e.g., Ehrlich and Lui, 1999; Sarte, 2000). A considerable amount of
empirical evidence shows that corruption directly deters economic growth
and development (e.g., Keefer and Knack, 1997; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Li
et al., 2000; Méon and Sekkat, 2005). Others explore the principal trans-
mission mechanism through which corruption reduces investment and hence,
hampers economic growth (e.g., Mauro, 1995; Mo, 2001).
However, it is reasonable to be cautious about the strong negative cor-
relation between corruption and growth. The incidence of corruption may
vary markedly across countries, and signicant diversity clearly exists con-
ditional on other social and economic factors. Neeman et al. (2008) nd
that the negative relationship between corruption and growth holds only for
countries with a high degree of nancial openness. In contrast, for those
countries with less nancial integration, the negative relationship more or
less disappears. Aidt et al. (2008) show that quality of institutions sub-
stantially a¤ects the impact of corruption on economic growth: corruption is
detrimental to growth where there are high-quality political institutions, but
otherwise has no impact on growth. Similar results can also be seen in Méon
and Weill (2010) who observe that corruption is less harmful to e¢ ciency
in countries with less e¤ective institutions, and may even improve e¢ ciency
where there are extremely ine¤ective institutions. The results of Méndez
and Sepúlveda (2006) indicate that the level of corruption which maximizes
growth is signicantly greater than zero. That is, corruption benets growth
at low levels of economic development and becomes detrimental to growth
as the economy develops to a high level.
It seems that not all countries over the world have su¤ered from wide-
spread corruption, while some countries have coped well. The most promi-
nent examples form the basis of what Wedeman (2002) termed the "East
Asian paradox": some countries in this region, such as China, Indonesia,
South Korea2 and Thailand, have grown remarkably well in spite of high
1This paper uses the most commonly used denition of corruption: corruption is dened
as misuse of power by public o¢ cials for private gain (see Bardhan, 1997).
2For more details of corruption in South Korea, see Kang (2002). Corruption is inter-
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levels of corruption.3 Campos et al. (1999) show that corruption has less
negative impact on investment when it is more predictable  being more
organised with less uncertainty. Rock and Bonnett (2004) point out that
the negative relationship between corruption and investment exists only in
small developing countries, but displays positive correlation in the large East
Asian newly industrialised economies (China, Indonesia, South Korea, Thai-
land and Japan). Given all the above, corruption appears to be less harmful
to economic growth in "East Asian paradox" countries, among which China
is the most striking example.4 Since the early 1980s, China has been one
of the most rapidly growing economies in the world with an average annual
growth rate of around 10%. At the same time however, corruption contin-
ues to thrive in China along with economic reforms. Why does corruption
not slow down economic growth in China? Would China grow even faster
if corruption were lower? In this paper, we aim to investigate how corrup-
tion a¤ects economic growth in China. In particular, we intend to see how
nancial development inuences the former relationship.5
To our knowledge, empirical studies on corruption and growth in China
remain scarce. A few cross country macro-level studies have China in their
sample (e.g., Méon and Sekkat, 2005; Neeman et al., 2008; Rock and Bon-
nett, 2004), though the results are mixed as we mentioned above. Fisman
and Svensson (2007) argue that cross country analysis is unable to tell us
much about the e¤ect of corruption on individual rms, which may lead to
suspicion of the existence of the negative role of corruption for growth at
the micro-level. Moreover, cross country studies neither allow us to analysis
variation of corruption within country nor to examine individual heterogene-
ity. In addition, many factors a¤ecting individual rms may not appear
in aggregate macroeconomic statistics. It is possible, and has been proved
preted as "money politics", which highlights the interaction between public and private.
3Even some developed countries share the same notoriety, such as Italy.
4A few theoretical papers have also attempted to explain the puzzle of high levels of
corruption but fast economic growth in "East Asian paradox" countries (see Blackburn
and Forgues-Puccio, 2009; Blackburn and Wang, 2009).
5A countrys nancial development plays an increasingly important role in economic
growth. There is not much doubt that better access to nance correlates with higher
growth and investment in developing countries. A great deal of research demonstrates
that a well developed nancial market promotes economic growth (e.g., Guiso et al., 2004;
Levine, 1997). See also World Bank (2001) for a detailed review. In China, nancial market
liberalization started in the early 1990s, when the policy banks started to be separated
from commercial banks. Despite the reforms, Chinese rms access less formal nance than
other Asian countries according to the World Bank (2003). Many studies emphasize the
prevalence of capital market imperfections in China, from both macro (e.g., Allen et al.,
2005; Guariglia and Poncet, 2008) and micro (e.g., Héricourt and Poncet, 2009; Guariglia
et al., 2011) perspectives.
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by Svensson (2003), that though corruption deters economic growth at the
macro-level, bribe payments correlate positively with a cross-section rm
growth in Uganda. Recently, rm-level research of corruption in China has
been conducted by the World Bank Group. Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2004)
used rm-level data from ve cities (Beijing, Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shanghai
and Tianjin) in 2002 and found that external nance signicantly improves
rm performance and the total number of days in dealing with government
inspectors positively a¤ects rmssales growth, though the magnitude is very
small. By using the same data, World Bank (2003) shows that corruption,
measured as an index comprising the governance e¤ectiveness, regulatory
burden, rule of law, the frequency and size of irregular payments, has nega-
tive impact on rmsgrowth rates of sales, but the impact is not statistically
signicant.
This paper aims to investigate the impact of corruption, together with
the comovement of corruption and nancial development, on rm growth
in China. In the existing literature, only very limited cross-country stud-
ies attempt to investigate the interaction between corruption and nancial
development on economic growth. The empirical results of Ahlin and Pang
(2008) show that corruption control and nancial development both improve
economic performance. The worse either of these, the greater the marginal
benet from an improvement in the other. Compton and Giedeman (2011)
nd similar results that banking development has reduced e¤ect on growth
when the institution quality is improved. The alternative results can be seen
in Demetriades and Law (2006), who nd that both institution improvement
and nancial development are necessary conditions for stimulating growth.
In addition, their results show that institutional improvement would bring
more economic growth in low-income countries, while nancial development
could generate more growth in middle-income and high-income countries but
with smaller magnitude. There is no micro-level study paying attention to
the inuence of interaction between corruption and nancial development on
rm growth. We intend to ll this gap in the literature. We also aim to detect
the impact of the interaction between corruption and nancial development
on rm growth cross ownership and regions. As economic reforms continue,
various types of ownership ourish in China replacing unitary state owner-
ship. In addition, there is a broad consensus that China is undergoing an
uneven growth pattern in di¤erent geographic regions Eastern and coastal
areas being more developed than Western and landlocked areas. It is there-
fore worth investigating whether corruption and its interaction with nancial
development play a di¤erent role across types of ownership and regions.
Our empirical analysis shows that the growth of rm sales income per em-
ployee is likely to benet from both nancial development in terms of easier
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access to formal loans and the presence of corruption, that is, corruption and
nancial development both appear to stimulate rm growth. Furthermore,
there exists evidence of substitution between the growth-enhancing e¤ects
of corruption and nancial development. Meaning that the slower nancial
development the less the marginal e¤ect from an improvement in governance
and so the greater is the marginal benet from misconduct. However, the
benet from the presence of corruption diminishes as the improvement in
nancial market continues, and eventually it deters rm growth. Once we
look at the di¤erent types of ownership and regions, results are consistent
with the full sample estimation though the magnitude varies accordingly.
The substitution relationship is particularly evident in the private and state-
owned rms. Consistent results can also be seen in the Southeast and Central
regions as well.
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 explores the
data. Section 3 introduces the methodology. Section 4 reports the empirical
results. We make a few concluding remarks in Section 5.
2 Data
2.1 Data Description
We use the Investment Climate Survey conducted by the National Bureau
Statistics of China in 2005.6 The survey interviewed 12,400 rms in 30 out
of 34 Chinese provinces.7 Those rms which could not supply data on key
indicators (corruption and nancial development) and reported unrealistic
rm age are excluded.8 As a result, the sample used in the empirical analysis
contains 12,212 rms. Only Tibet, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan are not
included in the sample. Therefore, our data represent geographical China.
As Table 1 indicates, 1 to 9 sample cities are drawn from each province.
There is only 1 sample city in Hainan, Qinghai and Xinjiang, except for
4 directly administered municipalities. Guangdong, Jiangsu and Shandong
6The corresponding data were downloaded from World Bank, Enterprise Surveys. In
addition, we use the report of World Bank (2006) for helping us construct our variables.
See Appendix, Table A1 for details.
734 provinces consist of 23 provinces, 5 autonomous regions, 4 directly administered
municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing) and 2 special administrative
regions (Hong Kong and Macau).
8In the survey, rms are asked to report in which year they were established. Some
rms reported a number smaller than 1000, which is unrealistic. We therefore trim o¤
the highest 1% according to the distribution of rm age. In our constructed sample, the
oldest rm was established in 1947 and the youngest in 2002.
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Table 1: Distribution of sample cities
provide more sample cities than other provinces, with 9 cities in each. Fol-
lowing World Bank (2006), 30 sample provinces are divided into six regions
(see Table 2). The Southeast includes the most sample cities, followed by
Bohai and then the Central. As a result, the regional share of sample rms
is highest in the Southeast. However, it seems that there is no substantial
sample bias in terms of regions which can been seen from Column (3) of
Table 2.
There are 31 industries in our data, among which the bulk-goods industry9
accounts for the most, which is 73.6%. The low-value industry, agricultural
and side-line food processing, follows (25.6%) and high-value industry has
the smallest proportion in the entire sample at 0.8%. Small and medium
sized rms, which are thought to be the "backbone" of the economy and to
help reduce the bias of rm level studies of corruption (World Bank, 2003),
are also well represented in the sample. In our sample, the median number of
employees is 255, while only 10% recruit more than two thousand employees.
The summary statistics of all variables are given in Appendix, Table A2.
Along with the decentralised enterprise reform in China, rms become in-
creasingly hybrid. The cooperation and partial privatization of state owned
enterprises (SOEs) in China has delegated authority by allocating managers
some e¤ective control rights such as production and income distribution,
while leaving the ultimate power with the government such as the appoint-
ment and dismissal of the general manager and the approval of large in-
vestment proposals (e.g., Qian, 1996). The state-owned assets management
9Bulk goods industry includes the production of raw chemical materials and chemical
products, nonmetal mineral products and smelting and processing of (non)ferrous metals.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of main variables, by region and province
Region Province %
firms
lnPGDP g FD C
Southeast Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang,
Fujian, Guangdong
26.75 9.509 0.146 3.209 0.130
Bohai Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei,
Shandong
16.84 9.228 0.190 2.967 0.176
Northeast Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang 8.66 9.168 0.187 2.908 0.149
Central Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei,
Hunan
23.54 8.534 0.151 2.865 0.132
Southwest Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan,
Guizhou, Yunan, Hainan
12.87 8.528 0.161 2.813 0.161
Northwest Shanxi, Shaanxi, Gansu,
Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang,
Inner Mongolia
11.33 8.792 0.143 2.543 0.172
Note: The classification of six regions follows World Bank (2006).
departments or agencies also inuence private rms by share trading, ac-
quisitions or merger. There are fewer rms with private shares alone and
these are usually smaller size. Our sample reects this phenomenon. 53.2%
of sample rms have a single kind of shares, the remaining are hybrid. The
fully private-owned rms, accounting for 14.5% of the full sample, have 402
employees on average. In comparison, the average number of employee is
1,142 in purely state owned rms whose share is 29.9%. 8.8% of rms only
have foreign shares. About 32% rms have three kinds of shares in their
ownership. At the same time, it is also di¢ cult to dene the private sector in
China. Some consider the nonstate sector is private sector. A better but nar-
row denition is given by Haggard and Huang (2008), where it is called the
"de jure" private sector including rms registered as private entities under
Chinese law. Taking into account this di¢ culty and rmshybrid features,
when classifying rm ownership, we do not refer to rmsregistration type,
but to their actual shareholder structure following Dollar and Wei (2007).
A rm is considered to be a state-owned rm if the state shares dominate
others. Privately-owned and foreign-owned rms are dened analogously.
2.2 Construction of Main Explanatory Variables
Before proceeding, it is useful to explore in-depth the features of key ex-
planatory variables. Figures 1 and 2 provide the distribution of the presence
level of corruption and nancial development, respectively.
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Figure 1: Distribution of corruption
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Corruption is di¢ cult to dene as it can take various forms and is even
more di¢ cult to measure due to its inherent secrecy. In this paper, we
use objective measure of corruption rather than subjective indicators which
could be less precise and sometimes biased (see Dethier et al., 2010). Among
objective corruption indicators, some studies use the amount of bribery as
a direct measure of corruption (e.g., Fisman and Svensson, 2007). Though
these questionnaires are better designed and try to ask the quantity of bribes
in a more implicit manner, such direct measurement still su¤ers from hidden
information or even potential falsity due to moral hazard.
Our corruption is measured as the proportion of days within a year that a
rm interacts with four government departments taxation, public security,
environment, labour and social security. We do so out of two considera-
tions. For one thing, according to World Bank (2003), rms cost which is
induced by the share of time that senior managers spend receiving govern-
ment o¢ cials can reect the cumbersome nature of dealing with extensive
regulations. This can be a further indication of corruption. For another,
this measure broadly captures possible bureaucratic malpractice with easy
and less biased responses from interviews. One may suppose that bureau-
cratic rent seeking only inuences the fundamental decision of entrepreneurs,
such as opening business, merging or claiming bankruptcy. However, corrupt
practices may also be involved in rmsday-to-day operations, which can
take many forms and shapes. For example, illegal payment to persuade tax
inspectors10, bribery to obtain and/or speed up the compulsory licenses (or
permits) during production or for future production, entertainment spending
to smooth relationships or build networks. As showned in Figure 1, 2.5% of
rms did not spend any time on corrupt practices. If 0 indicates no time
spent on corruption and 1 indicates the whole year dealing with corruption,
the average corruption level across all rms is 0.15 (54 days) and the median
time is 0.11 (39 days).
Our corruption measurement shows credibility. It correlates positively
with rmsentertainment and travel costs (ETC) shown in Figure 3, which
is demonstrated to be a proxy capturing some real bribes committed by Chi-
nese rms in Cai et al. (2011).11 In our questionnaire, rms are asked to
evaluate (or predict) the role of local government, if they have made (or
will carry out) acquisitions or mergers within a ve-year window. We nd a
positive correlation between this indicator and our corruption measurement:
10The tax rate is not uniform for every rm in China. Firms pay tax to both central
and local government. The tax rate also depends on rm types and regions. For more
details, see Cai et al. (2011).
11We use ETC in our regression as a robustness check. More discussion will be given in
Section 4.
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Figure 3: The relationship between corruption and ETC
the better a rms evaluation (or prediction), the more time the rm spends
with government departments. This implies that some time might have been
used to build networks with government in order to facilitate rmsproduc-
tion plans. Having said this, measurement errors are likely to persist to
some extent in corruption research due to the secretive nature of corrupt
behavior and the corruption data (e.g., Fisman and Svensson, 2007). Our
measurement cannot cover every aspect, nor allow us to identify the purpose
of corruption due to limited information.
Financial development is represented by how easy it is for rms to get
formal loans compared with previous years. Informal loans, albeit widely
existed, are not considered here, given that our aim is to study the impact
of formal sector on rm growth. On average, nance is still under developed
at the rm level, with the mean being 2.93. Only less than 10% of sample
rms felt they had easier access to loans from legal nancial and banking
institutions. About half of rms found it more di¢ cult to obtain loans and
about 15% reported no access to loans at all, which is in line with Haggard
and Huangs (2008) conclusion that rms found more di¢ culties in accessing
formal nance in 1990s than in 1980s.
Substantial disparities appear, once we look at the distribution according
to ownership. Figure 4 indicates that the highest corruption level can be
seen in the state-owned rms, which is 36% and 18% higher than in the
privately-owned and foreign-owned rms. The lowest corruption appears in
the privately-owned rms, which is 0.127 and equivalent to 46 days. As with
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Figure 4: Distribution of corruption, by ownership
nancial development (see Figure 5), foreign-owned rms account for most
of those reporting easier access to loans, while the state-owned rms account
for least. The distribution for foreign-owned rms is heavily skewed to the
right, indicating a better nancial environment. By contrast, many state-
owned rms appear to have equally experienced 1 to 4 categories of nancial
development, from "cant get loans" to "no changes". Figure 5 also shows
that the distribution for privately-owned rms is quite symmetric: most of
them lie in category 3 (a bit more di¢ cult), while those reporting 1 (cannot
get loans) and 5 (easier to get loans) are less. Whatever groups we look at,
the average nancial development is less than 4, which indicates that rms,
on average, did not perceive better access to loans compared with previous
years.
Given the uneven progress of development in China, there are also sub-
stantial regional disparities in the level of corruption and nancial develop-
ment. The shapes of regional distribution of corruption, which are drawn in
Figure 6, are very similar to the full sample, but distinct from each other
in extent. The Southeast and Central areas have lower corruption than the
sample mean: their average level of corruption is equivalent to 47 days. The
highest corruption can be seen in Bohai and the Northwest, where the average
number of days for interacting with the government departments is 64 and 62,
respectively. By contrast, as shown in Figure 7, the Southeast (Northwest)
that experienced the highest (lowest) nancial development. Only rms in
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Figure 5: Distribution of nancial development, by ownership
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Figure 7: Distribution of nancial development, by region
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the Southeast on average reported "a bit more" di¢ culty in obtaining loans.
In other regions, however, the average rm su¤ered "much more" di¢ culties
in getting external nance. For more accurate numbers, refer to the average
level of nancial development at the regional level in Column (6) of Table 2.
2.3 Firm Growth Measurement
Firm growth can be measured by various indicators, such as growth rates
of rm sales income, rm prots, employment and investment.12 In this
paper, we use the growth rate of rm sales income, which is in line with
Fisman and Svensson (2007) and also due to the following considerations.
First, the combination of di¤erent types of shareholders in China could
bring di¤erent objectives to Chinese rms. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argue
that controlling party may not have prot-miximizing objectives, especially
for the state shareholders. State may put increasing social welfare for the
public in priority. For Chinas case, especially local government, have in-
centives to extract revenue from rms on which they have control at their
disposal and then maximize prot (e.g., Qian and Stiglitz, 1996). Private
shareholders are more concerned with maximizing their share value in case
of using shares as collateral, and/or rms stock price if they wish to divest
12See Dethier et al., (2010) for a comprehensive review.
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holdings in the stock market (Firth et al., 2006). In general, maximization
of growth rate of sales income could better proxy for the goals of many man-
agement groups (Baumol, 1962).
Second, given the hybrid ownership and managerial discretion in Chinese
rms, managers incentives are neither very transparent nor easy to mea-
sure as indicated in Cai et al. (2011). The compensation of top managers
or CEOs are not always related to rm performance. Even for those where
top managers income and the rms performance are correlated, expand-
ing managerial discretion could be accompanied by high agency costs when
managers tend to experience a lack of accountability and external monitor
(Qian, 1996), and managers would rather seek unobserved income (Qian and
Stiglitz, 1996). Hence, rm sales income is an appropriate indicator to cap-
ture the realities.
Third, Cai et al. (2011) conclude that estimation based on the rms
prots should be treated with caution as losses could be caused by a rms
genuine failure in business as well as a rms false claim. Unfortunately, our
data do not allow us to distinguish between them. Moreover, prot hiding
has been a long and widespread phenomenon among Chinese rms. Qian and
Xu (1993) state that prot hiding for state-owned rms stems from the multi-
layer-multi-region (M-form) hierarchy in terms of both vertical and horizontal
interdependence. As the M-form economy becomes more decentralized, the
bottom level local governments are endowed with more autonomy in policy
making and more responsible for local economic development. Consequently,
competition of growing and getting richer rises across regions at the horizon-
tal line, which then passes greater pressure on local governments along the
vertical line (C. Xu, 2011). Therefore, as can be seen in Qian and Stiglitz
(1996), the state shareholders, especially lower-level governments and their
agencies, tempt to hide prots in order to avoid the interference and preda-
tion from higher-level governments. By doing so, lower-level governments are
able to hold wealth and resources, which can be used to boost local economy.
Better economic performance is in turn used to bargain with the higher-level
governments along the vertical line for favorable o¤ers and through bargain-
ing to get ahead of other regions along the horizontal line. Privately-owned
rms are worried more about the governments predation, hence rationally
hide excessive revenue by engaging in short-term or liquid projects (Qian,
2002).
Given the mixed and sometimes unobserved incentives and prot hid-
ing behavior, we therefore believe that an indicator like sales income would
produce more reliable estimation results. Considering larger rms may be
more visible to bureaucrats (e.g., Fisman and Svensson, 2007) and therefore
have to spend more time dealing with government departments. We take
14
Figure 8: Corruption, nancial development and rm growth
into account this size e¤ect by using the number of employees to normalize
rm sales income, and further including log of rms initial sales and log of
rms age as control variables as suggested by Fisman and Svensson (2007).
In addition, log of rms size is also included as a regressor in the estimation
which will be discussed more in Section 4.
The survey we used has only one cross section, however, the NBSC
recorded the nancial statements of rms for 2003, 2004 and 2005, which
allows us to calculate rm growth. The rm is indexed by i and its average
growth gi over the period 2003-2005 is calculated as the log di¤erence of its
total sales income per employee:
gi = (ln incomei;2005   ln incomei;2003)=2
As the aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between cor-
ruption and rm growth, it is useful to explore rst whether they are corre-
lated. Figure 8(a) clearly indicates that the more days spent with govern-
ment departments, the higher the rm growth. This contradicts the general
knowledge of corruption deterring growth. Somehow, corruption may be less
harmful for rm growth in China, or may even help with rm growth. Fig-
ure 8(b) shows that the improved access to loans also assists rm growth and
with a narrower condence interval, which is consistent with the general lit-
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erature of better nance promoting growth. Comparing (a) and (b), it seems
that the e¤ect of corruption on growth is much larger than that of nancial
development.
3 Methodology
Empirically, we begin by estimating a basic growth regression, in order
to study the impact of corruption and nancial development on rm growth,
and further investigate the interaction between corruption and nancial de-
velopment on rm growth.
gi = + 1Ci + 2FDi + 3FDi  Ci + 4Xi + 5Dc + i (1)
where gi denotes the two-year average growth rate of rm sales income. Ci
measures the level of corruption, which is presented by the proportion of days
within a year that the rm interacts with four government departments. FDi
denotes the nancial development experienced by the rm, measured by how
more or less di¢ cult the rm nds obtaining loans from legal nancial in-
stitutions compared with previous years. A set of dummies Dc controls for
other unobserved covariates at the city level. i is a white-noise error. Xi in-
cludes various rm characteristics and business climate indicators which are
suspicious to be correlated with rm performance in terms of sales income.
The selection of such variables are informed by the existing empirical lit-
erature through a "general-to-specic" approach suggested by Dethier et al.
(2010).13 Specically, Fisman and Svensson (2007) provide the most relevant
empirical study on corruption and growth of rm sales income. Among var-
ious control variables, they nd that taxation, whether doing international
trade and having foreign ownership account the most of rm growth. In
their study, rms initial sales income is used as an explanatory variables
to control the possible correlation between rm size and future growth "as
larger organizations are more visible to bureaucrats" (Fisman and Svensson,
2007, p.69). According to the comprehensive review conducted by Dethier
et al. (2010) and L. Xu (2011), many other factors may also play a role in
explaining rm performance, such as the rm age, the number of employees,
industry type, capital stock, innovation and learning, openness in terms of
both inter-provincial and international trade, human capital, labour relation
and status, market competition and regulation, infrastructure, and character-
istics of the city/region where the rm is located. We begin with estimating
(1) by a complete set of the aforementioned variables and then, pick up sig-
13For more details of "general-to-specic" approach, see Doornik (2009).
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nicant ones that best t our data (i.e., a testing-down approach)14. Detailed
construction and justication of nally included variables are spelled out in
Appendix, Table A1.
Among all regressors, corruption is presumably positively correlated with
rm growth in China. Therefore, one may expect a positive ^1. Financial
development are predicted to stimulate rm growth, which leads to a positive
^2. The sign of ^3, together with the former two estimated coe¢ cients, points
to either substituting or complementary roles of corruption and nancial
development on growth. More specically, for each rm, the total marginal
e¤ects of corruption and nancial development on growth conditional on the
other can be calculated as follows.
@gi
@Ci
= ^1 + ^3  FDi (2)
@gi
@FDi
= ^2 + ^3  Ci
Nevertheless, there is a typical concern over the above growth regression
on the endogeneity of corruption.15 This problem might arise if those rms
experiencing higher growth also devoted more e¤orts to handling relation-
ships with government departments. A fair amount of empirical evidence
suggests the reverse causation from economic growth to corruption, mean-
ing that the incidence of corruption is determined by the level of economic
development (e.g., Fisman and Gatti, 2002; Husted, 1999; Montinola and
Jackman, 1999; Paldam, 2002; Rauch and Evans, 2000; Treisman, 2000).
Kaufmann and Wei (2000) demonstrate that bureaucrats have discretionary
power given a certain regulation and would extort bribes according to a rms
ability to pay. The empirical work of Svensson (2003) shows that the bribe
payments are positively correlated with rm growth in Uganda.
We address the possible endogeneity issue by adopting two specications.
First, following Fisman and Svensson (2007), we use the industry-location
averages of corruption ( at the city level) as instruments of the presence cor-
ruption level. It is plausible that bureaucratspreference and behaviour in ex-
tracting bribes di¤er across locations and industries. It is therefore supposed
that industry-location averages are closely correlated with rmspractice of
14We select variables based on their t-tests. Those with p values greater than 0.1 are
dropped, except for key explanatory variables.
15The endogeneity of corruption is found both by Wu-Hausman F test and Durbin-Wu-
Hausman 2 test at the 5% signicance level. According to C-test (Baum et al., 2003), it
is statistically proved that nancial development can be treated as an exogenous variable
at any conventional signicance levels.
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corruption but little with the growth of their sales.16 A standard instrumen-
tal two-step least square (IV-2SLS) estimation is applied to (1). That is rst
estimating a corruption determination regression with the instruments and
all other explanatory variables except for corruption itself, and then sub-
stituting the predicted values of corruption into the growth regression and
using standard OLS. Second, considering the endogenous selection of rms
on whether to be corrupt, we implement the Heckman two-step method. In
the rst step, let ci = 1 (ci = 0) denote engaging (not engaging) in corrup-
tion.17 The probability of making such a decision for a rm is expressed by
the following probit regression.
Pr(ci = 1) = (z
0
i + ui > 0) (3)
where z
0
i includes all explanatory variables in (1) except for corruption and
interaction term of corruption and nancial development, plus two additional
instruments (whether the rm sells products to government and whether the
general manager is directly appointed by government). () is the cumulative
standard normal distribution function. Estimating (3) by maximum likeli-
hood method, yields the inverse Mills ratio, i =
( z0i)
1 ( z0i)
, where () denotes
the standard normal density function. The inverse Mills ratio indicates the
conditional probability of undertaking corruption given that the rm i had
not been corrupt. In the second step, inserting the inverse Mills ratio into
(1) gives the new growth regression to be estimated by OLS.
gi = + 1Ci + 2FDi + 3FDi  Ci + 4Xi + 5Dc + 6i + i (4)
The error terms ui and i are jointly bivariate normally distributed,
N(0; 0; 2 ; 
2
u; u). They are correlated through the correlation coe¢ cient
u, but independent with both sets of explanatory variables in (3) and (4).
Clearly, (4) makes rm growth depend on common factors that jointly a¤ect
rmsdecisions on being corrupt and their growth rates. In other words, in-
cluding i allows the determinants of corruption to inuence growth as well.
Therefore, a statistically signicant ^6 indicates the existence of endogene-
ity.18
16The correlation coe¢ cient between our instruments and the corruption variable is
0.46, while it is only 0.04 with rm growth.
17Given that our data do not directly record whether rms decide to be corrupt, a proxy
of ci is given as follows. First, ci = 1 if the rm has specialised sta¤ to handle government
relationships. Second, ci = 1 if the rms corruption variable is higher than a certain
percentile in the distribution of corruption across all rms. Specically, we use 75th and
50th percentiles, respectively.
18Actually, b6 = ^u^2 . Hence, a bigger ^u also points to the endogenous selection.
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One may also consider that more money needed to engage in corrupt prac-
tices could increase the demand for external funding and hence, corruption
and nancial development indicators are correlated. However, this is not a
serious problem in our data as the correlation coe¢ cient between corruption
and nancial development is very small, -0.026. The reason might be that
our nancial development indicator is not an "objective" measure of rms
nancial constraints, but rather the perception and judgement of the di¢ cul-
ties in obtaining loans from formal nancial institutions. Such "subjective"
measures may be more relevant to the local banking system, but independent
of the level of corruption that an individual rm commits.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Main Results
Our model specication has good acceptance. The statistically signicant
coe¢ cients of i in Columns (6) and (8), i.e., b6 in (4), suggest that there
exists a problem of endogeneity, meaning there are some common but unob-
served factors simultaneously a¤ecting a rms decision on being corrupt and
growth. Moreover, the positive value of b6 implies that these unobserved or
omitted factors that make rms more likely to corrupt also generate growth.
To address the endogeneity issue, it can be seen that our choice of instrument,
i.e., the industry-location (at the city level) averages of corruption, passes all
instrument tests as indicated in the last three rows in Columns (1)-(3). In
Columns (4) and (5), we further use whether the rm has specialized sta¤ to
handle the government relations as a complementary rm-level instrument
to the industry-location averages of corruption. It appears to be valid as
the Sargan test is passed with Sargan statistic 0.185 and 0.106 in Columns
(4) and (5) respectively, i.e., the null hypothesis of exogenous instruments is
conrmed. There are no distinct estimates across the rst four columns.
Most explanatory variables suggest the expected signs and show high
robustness across di¤erent model specications. From the view of production,
switching from either the low- or high-value goods industry to the bulk-goods
industry and higher openness in terms of both exports and inter-provincial
trade can bring more income for rms. A younger rm is more capable of
generating more sales income, and so are those who accumulated more xed
assets in the initial year. A higher level of utilized production capacity is
usually correlated with higher productivity and indicates that unproductive
rms might have exited the market (Hallward-Driemeier et al., 2004). A
positive correlation between production capacity and rm growth is therefore
19
Figure 9: Total marginal e¤ects, full sample
as expected. The negative estimated coe¢ cient of sales income per employee
in the initial year, implies that there might be a catch-up or convergence
process across sample rms in the their sales income growth. Consistent
with Fisman and Svensson (2007), a lower level of government expropriation
in terms of less burden of taxes and fees stimulates rm growth. They also
argue that greater foreign ownership would bring greater resources, access
to markets and advanced technologies to rms and hence make them grow
faster. The share of foreign ownership in our estimation provide further
support to this argument. Moreover, a higher share of state ownership is
likely to promote rm growth, which is consistent with Jiang et al. (2008)
who nd that share of state ownership tend to positively a¤ect Chinese rm
performance over the period 2001-2005. At the moment, the only seemingly
unclear variable is rm size. Generally speaking, smaller rms intend to have
faster growth. It may also be the case that bigger rms expand their sales
income more due to the larger market power. We will return to this point
later.
Both nancial development and corruption are likely to push rms to
grow further in all model specications, which is consistent with exploratory
analysis in Figure 8. Better chance to access external nance will promote
rm growth due to the imperfection in Chinese capital markets as argued
by Poncet et al. (2010). The positive e¤ect of corruption is not only drawn
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from the positive estimated coe¢ cient, but also from the positive correlation
between residuals in (3) and (4). The correlation coe¢ cient bu decreases
slightly from 0.86 in Column (6) to 0.82 in Column (8). The LR test of zero
correlation coe¢ cient is rejected at the 1% signicance level for all columns
from (6) to (8). This indicates that the rms which elect to be corrupt
do have higher growth rates relative to those with average characteristics
randomly drawn from the population.
According to Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2004), the positive relationship
between the presence of corruption and rm growth may have two reasons.
First, the one who grows fast may attract more attention from public o¢ -
cials, hence need to spend more time on dealing with government depart-
ments. Second, the one who plans to grow fast may require new licenses (or
permits) for future production and hence increase meeting time with public
o¢ cials. The second point of view is also in alignment with Cai et al. (2011).
They use a rms ETC as the proxy for corruption and demonstrate that not
all corruption components worsen rm growth, although nding an over-
all negative correlation between corruption and growth in 18 Chinese cities.
More specically, they nd that the bribery component of ETC, which acts
as the "grease" and/or "protection" money, brings positive returns to rms.
Extended from the idea of Cai et al. (2011), if the proportion of "good cor-
ruption" components the one used as "grease" and/or "protection" money
to improve government e¢ ciency  dominates the negative e¤ect induced
by the "bad corruption" components, it is possible to observe empirically a
positive relationship between rm growth and the presence of corruption.19
This is also consistent with the well-known "speed money" hypothesis (e.g.,
Huntington, 1968; Le¤, 1964; Leys, 1970; Lui, 1985). Corruption may help
circumvent cumbersome regulations (red tape), hence improve e¢ ciency ex-
tended to stimulate economic growth.20 The "good corruption" components
are used as "speed money", which could promote rm growth by overcom-
ing the less e¢ cient regulations.21 Our micro-level results in China provides
further support to the macro-level study of Rock and Bonnett (2004).It also
19In Column (5) of Table 3, we experimented with ETC per employee as another proxy
for corruption. Our previous nding still remain valid.
20The measurement of business entry by Djankov et al. (2002) shows that China required
12 procedures to start a business, more than the average of 10 in 85 sample countries. In
addition, it takes 92 days to complete all procedures, which is far more longer than the
sample average of 47 days.
21The nature of corruption may be another possible explanation. A few theoretical
papers demonstrate that corruption is less harmful to economic growth in China because
of the organised nature of corruption which internalises the externalities by reducing the
uncertainty of rent seeking (see Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio, 2009; Blackburn andWang,
2009).
21
turns out that the magnitude of the positive impact of corrupt practices is
greater than that of nancial development, which has also been illustrated
earlier in Figure 8.22
Of particular interest is the fact that the estimated coe¢ cient of the in-
teraction term is statistically negative. This indicates that, given the positive
inuence of nancial development (or corruption) on growth, more days spent
in interactions with government departments (or better access to loans) tend
to reduce the growth-enhancing e¤ect of the other. In other words, there
exists a substitution relationship between nancial development and corrup-
tion. A corruption (or nancial development) threshold, in which the positive
impact of nancial development (or corruption) on growth vanishes, can be
calculated by using (2). In this sub-section, we use Column (3) of Table 3
which contains all three key explanatory variables. As shown in Figure 9(a),
the corruption threshold is 0.19 (70 days a year) for the full sample. Hence,
nancial development can promote rm sales income growth only if a rm
spends less than 70 days a year on dealing with government departments.
About 73% rms in our sample devoted less than 70 days a year to corrupt
practises. Among these rms, 72% are in the bulk-goods industry and 61%
are located in the Southeast and Central. By analogy, the nancial develop-
ment threshold is found to be 3.75. This indicates that corruption is benecial
to rm sales income growth only if the level of nancial development is lower
than "no changes", i.e., still facing same level of di¢ culty for rms to obtain
loans compared with previous years. From Figure 7, it can be seen that only
a very small proportion of rms reported that it became easier to get loans in
any region, meaning that there was no signicant improvement in nancial
markets and banking systems in providing loans. However, as clearly indi-
cated in Figure 9(b), the growth caused by corruption diminishes as nancial
markets become better functioned and there exists a growth-reducing e¤ect
once across the nancial development threshold. This implies that if there
exists a less restricted capital market, the presence of corruption is mean-
ingless as "speed money" and ultimately destructive. This argument on the
transitory role of corruption during di¤erent stages of nancial development
could be extended to the cases of other institutional development.
22The Wald test, H0 : b1 = b2, is rejected at 1% signicance levels from Columns (2)
to (4).
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It is also interesting to explore the possible interplay between corruption
and rm size that may alter the impact of corruption on growth. As seen
in Columns (4) of Table 3, when including the interaction term of corrup-
tion and rm size, the estimated coe¢ cient of rm size becomes positive,
while the interaction term is negative.23 This implies some degrees of sub-
stitutions between rm size and corruption on promoting rm growth. More
specically, increasing corruption brings more growth for small rms than
for the large. One possible explanation is that big rms and public section
may have involved in a "mutual hostages game" which is alignment with
the South Korea case in old time as mentioned in Kang (2002). Small rms
usually could not have this privilege. Therefore, once practicing the same
amount of corruption, small rms could benet more. When we control for
this substitution e¤ect, rm size positively a¤ects the growth. The statisti-
cally negative estimates of rm size in Columns (1)-(3) are a net outcome of
substitution e¤ect of corruption and the growth-increasing e¤ect of rm size
per se.
4.2 Ownership Heterogeneity
We further detect whether a variety of ownership alters the estimation
results revealed in the full sample. To see this, we use the specication of
Column (3) of Table 3 to re-estimate the growth regression for sub-groups
with di¤erent ownership. As we stated in Section 2.1, a rms ownership is
classied by the dominated share amount all. For example, if state share
is dominant, the rm is marked as a state-owned rm. We nd consistent
results for both state-owned and privately-owned rms as in the full sample.
Corruption and nancial development impose positive impact on rm
growth and their interaction term appears to be negative in Columns (1)
and (2) of Table 4. Our estimation results suggest stronger direct impact
of corruption and nancial development on rm sales income growth in the
privately-owned rms than in the state-owned rms. One additional day
spending in corruption increases privately-owned rm growth by 0.58%. In
comparison, the magnitude of this direct growth-enhancing impact is only
half of that, 0.29%, in the state-owned rms. In reality, most rms seem not
to spend too many days a year dealing with government departments. As
illustrated in Figure 1, the median corruption level in our sample is 39 days.
Unlimited growth would not occur if rms simply resorted to increasing
23However, including the interaction term between corruption and rm size may cause
misspecication. We nd some correlations between this interaction term and a few in-
dependent variables. Therefore, we only use this regression to discuss the possible role of
rm size in the corruption-rm growth nexus.
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Figure 10: Total marginal e¤ect of FD on g conditional on C, by ownership
corruption. Though the slope for corruption is much steeper in Figure 8, a
very large proportion is not achievable.
Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2004) state that rms require additional per-
mits or licenses if they plan to expand or innovate and therefore, need to
spend more time handling relationships with o¢ cials. This may be experi-
enced by the private-owned rms rather than the state-owned ones as the
latter have already established close relationships with the government.24 Li
et al. (2008) also demonstrates that government imposes heavy regulations
(red tape) on private rms in China. However, the private rms are usu-
ally more e¢ cient and productive than the SOEs and serve as the engine of
growth in China (e.g., Guariglia et al., 2011; Poncet et al., 2010). Hence, if
corruption e¤ectively reduces the waiting time, extended to stronger positive
e¤ect on growth, it is reasonable to see that the former performs better than
the latter when they both spend one additional day on corruption.
One may also consider that corruption should generate more growth in
the state-owned rms, as managers have better relationships with government
departments and get used to dealing with bureaucrats. In this case however,
once there is less uncertainty of corrupt practices between managers and
24As can be seen in Figure 4, the average presence level of corruption in the SOEs is
35% higher than that of the private rms in our sample.
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Figure 11: Total marginal e¤ect of C on g conditional on FD, by ownership
relevant bureaucrats, corruption is equivalent to an additional tax. Therefore,
it is less e¢ cient as "speed money" extended to generate less growth for the
state-owned rms.
The direct impact of nancial development is also bigger for the privately-
owned rms. One categorical increase in nancial development for privately-
owned rms brings about 8% more growth, while 6.9% in the case of state-
owned rms. This may be due to the fact that state-owned rms have a better
chance of getting soft budget, as argued in Qian and Roland (1998) that SOEs
still experience soft budget constraint. The median loan quota enjoyed by
state-owned rms per annum is about 30 million RMB, in sharp contrast to 9
million for privately-owned rms in our sample.25 In the study of Allen et al.
(2005), the SOEs in China received an increasing amount of state budget from
1994 to 2002. They are more able to get nancial help from the government,
but this is not the case for the private rms in Poncet et al. (2010). In
addition, privately-owned rms are su¤ering from serve nanical constrains
in the study of Haggard and Huang (2008). Among all types of ownership,
Guariglia et al. (2011) nd the private rms are most sensitive to external
nancial constraints. Therefore, improved nancial markets would especially
25We further calculate the loan quota per employee considering the size e¤ect. The
median loan quota per employee is 42% higher for state-owned rms (47000 RMB) than
for privately-owned rms (33000 RMB).
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benet private rms by loosening their external nancial constraints.
Furthermore, as in the full sample, we consider the indirect inuence
and calculate the total marginal e¤ects for state-owned and privately-owned
rms, together with the corresponding corruption and nancial development
thresholds. Figures 10 and 11 indicate that nancial development and cor-
ruption act as substitutes in promoting rm growth. It can be seen in Figure
10 that the corruption threshold for state-owned rms (0.22) is higher than
that of privately-owned rms (0.14). Suppose the presence level of corrup-
tion is 0.14, nancial development has no impact on privately-owned rms
growth, but still generates positive returns for the state-owned rms. Once
surpassing corruption thresholds, the negative impact of nancial develop-
ment on rm sales income growth is bigger for the privately-owned rms,
while for the state-owned rms are less responsive. This may be because
corruption is more predictable for the state-owned rms like an additional
tax. Hence, the external nance causes less growth-enhancing e¤ect than
for the privately-owned rms under the relatively lower level of corruption.
Correspondingly, the growth-reducing e¤ect induced by the nance is smaller
for the state owned rms when corruption is pervasive.
By analogy, we compute the nancial development thresholds in Figure
11. It is noticeable that the nancial development thresholds are not very
di¤erent between the state-owned and privately-owned rms: corruption im-
poses positive impact on growth for both types of rms when they encounter
more di¢ culties in obtaining loans (i.e., FD<4) compared with the previous
years. When the level of nancial development is higher than the thresholds,
corruption tends to hamper rm sales income growth and this inuence is
greater for the privately-owned rms. It becomes clearer that the total mar-
ginal e¤ect of corruption on rm growth is more responsive in the case of
privately-owned rms due to the higher uncertainty on corruption compared
with the state-owned rms.
4.3 Regional Heterogeneity
Given the large regional disparities in China, it is also possible that the
above substituting relationship might not be a common phenomenon across
the country. Therefore, we continue using Column (3) of Table 3 to estimate
each region. The Southeast and Central regions suggest the consistent and
statistically signicant estimated coe¢ cients of corruption, nancial develop-
ment and the interaction term, shown in Columns (3)-(4) of Table 4, which is
consistent with the estimation of full sample. In other regions, the estimates
of these main variables are insignicant. It is therefore not of valuable to
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investigate them further.26
The direct impact of corruption and nancial development on rm growth
is positive and much greater in the Southeast than in the Central region. The
impact of corruption (nancial development) on rm growth in the South-
east is about 6 (5) times that in the Central. This nding may be driven
by the rm composition in the alternative regions. The proportion of the
state-owned rms is 12.53% in the Southeast, while 29.77% in the Central
region. As we have discussed in the previous subsection, the growth of the
state-owned rms benets less from an additional increase in either corrupt
practices or nancial development than do the privately-owned rms. This
micro-level phenomenon appears to add up to the regional level. In addition,
di¤erent degrees of competition for the limited available loans may also ex-
plain why Southeast is more responsive to external nance and corrupt prac-
tices. In our sample, 47.30% of rms in the Southeast are privately-owned
and 40.18% are foreign-owned, in contrast to 61.17% and 9.06% in turn in
the Central area. Referring back to Figure 5, more foreign-owned rms feel
it easier to access loans than private rms. Banks are more likely to lend to
foreign-owned rms compared to privately-owned rms. In our sample, the
median loan quota enjoyed by foreign-owned rms is about 40 million RMB
(compared with 9 million RMB for privately-owned rms as shown earlier),
and the value per employee is also highest among three types of ownership.
Hence, there is a possibility that the external nance for privately-owned
rms has been crowded out by the huge amount of foreign-owned rms in
the Southeast, while the situation is less severe in the Central where there are
far fewer foreign-owned rms. This further supports the nding of Haggard
and Huang (2008) that Chinese government gives priority to foreign rms
rather than the domestic private rms. This is not seen in the experience
of East Asian newly industrialized countries except in Singapore. The own-
ership structure within private rms may also play a role in their ability to
obtain loans. Guariglia et al. (2011) nd that private rms that have negli-
gible foreign participation (lower than 10% of ownership) and operate in the
coastal region are subject to the highest competition for external funds and
therefore, benet most from higher cash ow. In our sample, over 95% of
the private rms in the Southeast have less than 10% foreign ownership.
26If not controlled for the interaction term, nancial development suggests signicantly
positive impact on rm growth in Bohai, Northeast, Northwest and Southwest, while
corruption is never signicant. As the estimates are insignicant, the 95% condence
intervals for the interaction terms are wide with the upper and lower bounds being above
and below the horizontal axes respectively and moving towards the alternative directions.
A conclusive nding can not be made on how corruption a¤ects rm growth conditional
on nancial development in these regions. Estimated results are available upon request.
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Figure 12: Total marginal e¤ect of FD on g conditional on C, by region
Figure 13: Total marginal e¤ect of C on g conditional on FD, by region
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With regard to the indirect e¤ect, in terms of the interaction term of cor-
ruption and nancial development, Figure 12 and 13 show that they appear
to be substitutes in both the Southeast and Central regions. Similarly to
the full sample case, we calculate the total marginal e¤ects of corruption and
nancial development at the regional level and the corresponding corruption
and nancial development thresholds. Figure 12(a) suggests that if a rm
in the Southeast spends more than 12% time of a year (44 days) handleing
government relationships, easier access to loans would not bring more sales
income, but rather deter its growth. Likewise, in Figure 13(a), if a rm in
the Southeast nds it di¢ cult to obtain loans (FD<3.62), the improvement
in governance would provide lower benet to its growth. This nding also
underlines a nonlinear relationship between corruption and rm growth. Fur-
thermore, it can be seen from Figure 12 that when the quality of governance
is not very poor (below the corruption threshold in the Southeast, 44 days),
better access to loans tends to bring a stronger growth-enhancing e¤ect for
the Southeast, the area with more foreign-owned rms, compared to the
Central. Similarly, in Figure 13, if nancial markets are not well functioned
(below the nancial development threshold, 3.62), the presence of corruption
appears to promote rm growth more in the Southeast. Conversely, it is
also worth noting that, when the nancial markets are well developed (the
quality of governance is very low), the presence of corruption (the nance)
suggests a stronger growth-deterring e¤ect for the Southeast. To conclude,
compared to the Central, the richer Southeast seems to enjoy as well as su¤er
more from the impact of corruption on rm growth, which largely relies on
the development of nancial markets.
5 Conclusion
Corruption is detrimental to economic growth in the consensus view of
development experts. Nevertheless, it may hamper growth to a lesser or
greater degree depending on other social and economic factors. Empirical
evidence suggests that not all countries with widespread corruption have
su¤ered poor growth performance. China, as one of the "East Asian paradox"
countries, has grown remarkably well in spite of high levels of corruption.
This paper has sought to provide an explanation of the above puzzle from
micro-level. We investigated how rm growth is a¤ected by the presence
of corruption and how the former relationship varies according to nancial
development. In addition, we examined in-depth whether the previous results
change across types of ownership and regions.
Our results conrm the accepted facts that rm growth is promoted by
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a well functioned nancial market. Importantly, the high corruption but
fast growth puzzle is resolved by the micro-level evidence that corruption
committed by rms indeed enhances the growth of their sales income. This
phenomenon has been further investigated by the interaction term of corrup-
tion and nancial development. The negative impact of the interaction term
on rm growth, indicates that corruption and nancial development are sub-
stitutes to promote rm growth. Therefore, if one is worse, a stronger growth
inuence is caused by increasing the other. However, this substitution rela-
tionship does not always benet rm growth. The growth-enhancing e¤ect
of corruption diminishes along with the nancial development; nancial de-
velopment benets rm growth more where there is less corruption. Similar
results as full sample, can be particularly observed for the privately-owned
rms and in the Southeast region. A slightly weaker e¤ect is detected for the
state-owned rms and in the Central region.
It is worth emphasizing that our results are context-specic, particular to
China. This may not t well with the conventional consensus of development
experts. China is experiencing transition in its institutional and economic
development, while the transition involves a variety of reforms. Some of the
reforms happen more quickly than others, and many of them are cointe-
grated with each other in terms of inuencing economic performance. Eco-
nomic reforms create more opportunities and incentives to engage in corrupt
practices (e.g., Bardhan, 1997), while improvements in institutions largely
lag behind. Although low-quality institutions per se are bad for growth,
their inuence could be mitigated by the presence of corruption. At the
current development stage, corruption helps circumvent cumbersome regu-
lations as "speed money" and therefore, improves e¢ ciency and extends to
stimulate economic growth. However, as institutional improvements con-
tinue, the benets of corruption will be reduced and eventually exhausted.
This implies that corruption could bring some benets during transition,
but will ultimately be destructive unless anti-corruption policy is put into
place. Additionally, the unique Chinese pattern is partly caused by the com-
mon feature of the "East Asian paradox" countries: having well-organised
corruption networks. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) demonstrate that corrup-
tion is less damaging when it is more organised (or coordinated) because of
the internalisation of externalities. Also, a more organised corruption net-
work reduces the uncertainty that corruption generates and hence, causes
less damage.
The above two conditions coexists and therefore, we observe the posi-
tive impact of corruption on rm growth during the transition. However,
this growth-enhancing e¤ect caused by corruption is transitory. Sustainable
growth eventually requires well functioned institutions.
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Appendix
Table A1 Construction and justication of variables
Variable Definition
Firm growth ½[ln(firm total sales in 2005 per employee)-ln(firm total sales in
2003 per employee)]. Firms’total sales in 2003 are inflated to
2005 prices using provincial CPI.a
Financial
development
1-5 categorical variable indicating how easily the firm is able to
get loans since the macro policy changed in 2003, with 1
representing cannot get loans and 5 meaning easier.
Corruption Share of days per year that the firm spends in dealing with four
government departments: taxation, public security, environment
and labour and social security. The higher the value, the higher
the corruption.
ETC Log expenditure in business travel, conferences and
entertainment per employee, in 2005 prices.
Firm age No. of years since the firm was established.
Firm size No. of employees in 2005.
Bulk goods
industryb
Whether the firm belongs to the bulk goods industry, yes=1.
Share of state
ownership
Shares owned by governments or their agencies.
Share of foreign
ownership
Shares owned by foreign investors and/or firms.
Production
capacity
Share of real output in the maximum output if all input is used
in production.
Sales per employee Total sales per employee in 2003, inflated to the real term in
2005 prices by provincial CPI.
Value of fixed
assets per
employee
Value of fixed assets per employee in 2003, inflated to the real
term in 2005 prices by provincial price indices of fixed
investment.
Share of taxes &
fees in sales
Share of all taxes and fees in the firm’s total sales in 2005.
Export Whether the firm directly exports goods, yes=1.
Share of inter-
prov. sales
Share of the firm’s inter-provincial sales in its total sales in
2005.
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Note: a. Incomes are inflated to 2005 prices using provincial CPI. The value of fixed assets is
inflated to 2005 prices using provincial price indices of fixed asset investment. Both
kinds of price indices come from China Data Centre, University of Michigan.
b. This categorisation follows World Bank (2006). Low-value industry includes
agricultural and side-line food processing, food production, and textile, garment,
shoes and caps manufacturing. Bulk goods industry includes the production of raw
chemical materials and chemical products, nonmetal mineral products and smelting
and processing of (non)ferrous metals. High value industry includes pharmaceuticals,
and medical, electronics and telecoms equipment.
Table A2 Descriptive statistics, full sample
Variables Mean Median S.E. Min. Max. Obs.
g 0.160 0.123 0.362 -3.398 10.901 10753
C 0.148 0.107 0.149 0 1 12107
FD 2.935 3 1.179 1 5 11699
ETC -0.002 0.129 1.760 -8 8.584 12089
ln(firm age) 2.112 2.079 0.856 0.693 4.043 12212
ln(firm size) 5.559 5.521 1.417 1.792 9.148 12089
share of state owned 0.465 0.483 0.439 0 1 12212
share of foreign owned 0.147 0 0.318 0 1 12212
bulk goods industry 0.736 1 0.441 0 1 12212
production capacity 0.828 0.900 0.180 0 1 12182
ln(sales income per
employee) in 2003
5.229 5.191 1.287 -15.604 15.152 12212
ln(fixed assets per
employee) in 2003
0.082 0.041 0.117 0.0001 2.572 12182
share of tax & fees in sales 0.037 0.030 0.039 0 1.169 10753
export 0.412 0 0.492 0 1 12212
share of inter-prov. sales 0.393 0.300 0.348 0 1 12211
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